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Since 2001, the United States has been involved in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well
as other military engagements throughout the world as part of its “War on Terror.”
Consequently, federal defense spending has increased at a much higher rate than other areas of
the budget. What contributed to the significant increases in defense spending between 20012010, and what can be done to avoid the budget deficits that it led to in the future? This paper
will examine events that contributed to the massive spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
as well as the budget deficits that resulted, in part, from these wars. The author will examine
defense-related expenditures from Fiscal Years (FY) 2001-2010 and the impact they had on the
federal budget, followed by offering recommendations on reducing defense spending to curtail
the federal deficit. It is important to study this situation not only to understand how the United
States got into this budget crisis, but also to understand how such a situation could be handled
differently in the future.

Budget Background
Wildavsky (2004) describes the federal budget as being a representation in monetary
terms of government activity. As shown in Figure 1, the Federal Government spent $3.46 trillion
in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Meanwhile, it only brought in $2.16 trillion in revenue,
leaving a deficit of over $1.3 trillion. The budgets of the early 2000’s were significantly different
than they have been in previous years. In 2001 the government was bringing in more money than
it was spending, which is also known as a surplus. According to the Census Bureau (2012), in
2001 the Federal Government spending was at $1.86 trillion and revenue was $1.99 trillion,
leaving a surplus of over $128 billion. From just 2001 to 2010, spending increased 86%, from
$1.86 trillion to $3.46 trillion. Meanwhile, revenue only increased 8.5%, from $1.99 trillion to
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$2.16 trillion. As a result, national debt has grown from $5.77 trillion in 2001 to $13.53 trillion
in 2010. The budget is so vast and the large numbers can seem intangible, therefore breaking it
down into spending categories will help us better understand.

Figure 1: Federal Government Expenditures & Revenue: 2001-2010 ($ Trillions)
(Note: Amounts in charts are in current dollars)
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The two broad types of federal spending are mandatory and discretionary. Mandatory
spending, also known as entitlements, provides assistance to citizens in forms of Social Security,
Medicare, and other programs. Mandatory spending also includes the interest the Treasury pays
for the government’s debts. These expenditures make up the bulk of federal expenditures. As
shown in Figure 2, mandatory spending climbed from $1.21 trillion in 2001 to $2.11 trillion by
2010 (OMB, 2013). Cote (2011,) noted that mandatory spending accounted for 61% of the
budget as of 2010. Wildavsky (2004), however, argued that when making the budget, Congress

3
spends more time on what it can easily change (discretionary spending) than on entitlement
reform.

Figure 2: Federal Government Mandatory Expenditures: 2001-2010 ($ Trillions)
(Note: Social Security, Medicare, & Net Interest are major mandatory categories)
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Discretionary spending is what funds most governmental agencies. Defense spending
makes up a majority of Congress’ discretionary budget. Defense spending totaled $693.59 billion
for the year 2010, while non-defense discretionary spending totaled $658.30 billion as shown in
Figure 3 (OMB, 2011). Other notable areas of government covered under discretionary spending
are transportation, natural resources, and education. Figure 3 shows defense expenditures
accounted for $304.73 billion in 2001 (OMB, 2011), which means the government spent $388.86
billion more in 2010. Cote (2011, p. 4) pointed out that defense spending increased at a higher
rate than non-defense discretionary spending in the past decade.
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Figure 3: Federal Defense Spending: 2001-2010 ($ Billions)
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(Source: Office of Management and Budget)
The increases in defense spending take away from other areas of the budget.
Representative David Obey (D-Wisconsin) warned that the hundreds of billions of dollars being
spent fighting the two wars has taken away from crucial investments in education, job training,
health care, and energy independence (Friel, 2009). McGovern (2006) quoted James Galbraith,
Professor of Government at the University of Texas, who said empires collapse not because of
military defeat but because of bankruptcy. Galbraith argues that borrowing hundreds of billions
of dollars every year adds to the national debt tremendously, as well as not investing that money
toward infrastructure in America. In 2010, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff cited our national debt as the greatest threat to our national security (Adams & Leatherman,
2011).
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In 2008, the U.S. military spent $1,500 per capita while its NATO allies spent $500 per
capita (Thompson, 2011). Our allies devote less of their budget to defense spending and more
toward areas such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare (Thompson, 2011).
After highlighting some aspects of the federal expenditures over the past decade, now the
revenue side of the budget will be examined to see if it is keeping pace with the increased
defense spending, as shown in Figure 4. In 2001, the federal government generated $1.99 trillion
in revenues. However, revenue dipped below $2 trillion from 2001 through 2004 in part because
of the Bush tax cuts. The Bush tax cuts brought the highest marginal tax rate down from 39.6%
to 35%. Since Americans were getting taxed at the lower rate, revenue proceeded to decline. In
2010, federal revenue was $2.16 trillion (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Revenue was up to around
the $2.5 trillion mark from 2006-2008, but the large recession of 2008 brought revenue down
considerably. As noted earlier, from 2001-2010, spending nearly doubled from $1.8 trillion to
$3.4 trillion. In the spirit of maintaining a balanced budget, we would hope to see revenue go up
at nearly the same rate. Instead, revenue was only slightly greater in 2010 than it was in 2001.
That resulted in massive budget deficits. The deficits have led to a 134.5% increase in federal
debt, going from $5.77 trillion to $13.53 trillion between 2001-2010.

Defense Background
Recent increases in defense spending, although greater, have followed the trend of other
major spending increases within the federal budget. Before tackling the reasons behind the
increases, it is important to view how the defense budget fits into the federal budget and what
constitutes the appropriations.
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Figure 4: Federal Government Revenue vs. Defense Spending: 2001-2010 ($ Trillions)
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According to Foster et al (2008), since World War II there has been a permanent war
economy in the United States. Defense spending was vastly increased toward the end of the war
and had the effect of pulling the country out of the Great Depression, establishing the positive
relationship between defense spending and economic prosperity. In the six years following
World War II, the economy expanded 70 percent (Foster et al, 2008). This came to be known as
“military Keynesianism,” after the economist John Maynard Keynes who theorized that in order
to stimulate an economy, the government should increase spending. This permanent war
economy has been around throughout the Cold War, Vietnam, and now the War on Terror.
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Figure 5: Federal Government Debt: 2001-2010 ($ Trillions)

16
14
13.53
12

$ Trillions

10
8.95

8

Federal Debt

7.35

6
5.77
4
2
0
2001

2004

2007

2010

(Source: U.S. Census Bureau)
Prior to detailing some specific factors that led to such elevated defense spending, it is
important to highlight the different areas within the defense budget that receive funding, which
can be found in Figure 7. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 40% of
defense spending went towards operations and maintenance, the priciest aspect of defense
spending, which cost $275.99 billion in 2010 (2011). Personnel costs accounted for 23% of the
defense budget and were the second costliest at $155.69 billion. Procurement costs made up 19%
of defense spending with a price tag of $133.6 billion. Eleven percent of the 2010 defense budget
was spent on research, development, testing, and evaluation, which cost $76.99 billion. The other
minor costs associated with defense spending include military construction, family housing, and
atomic energy activities, which accounted for about 7% of the defense budget or $51.32 billion.
The wars with Afghanistan and Iraq contributed to the increase in the defense spending
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categories, particularly the operati
operations and personnel costs. To show just how much defense
spending increased from 2001-2010,
2010, the total defense spending of 2001 (($304.73
$304.73 billion) was
only slightly greater than the cost of operations and maintenance in 2010 ($275.99 billion).

Federal Defense Spending by Category: 2010
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Post 9/11
The September 11 terrorist attacks greatly affected American foreign policy, defense
spending, and the federal budget. War ensued with Afghanistan and Ira
Iraq
q as part of the War on
Terror. Stiglitz and Bilmes’’ (2008
(2008) book entitled: The Three Trillion Dollar War attempts to
quantify the total cost of the two wars to the nation at $2.7 trillion from the onset of the
Afghanistan War inn 2001 through the next decade.. That is almost equivalent to the amount spent
by the entire federal government in 2010. Although that $2
$2.7
.7 trillion is spread out over more than
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a decade, it is still a significant amount of money that surely will have ripple effects across
government.

The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars
The War in Afghanistan commenced shortly after 9/11, resulting in the United States
toppling the Taliban regime in a matter of weeks. According to Robert Sunshine (2007), the
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis at the Congressional Budget Office $14 billion was spent
in 2001 and $18 billion in 2002 towards the war in Afghanistan. Although not in power, the
Taliban still has maintained strongholds throughout the country. During operations in
Afghanistan from 2001-2003, President George W. Bush, with the advice and encouragement of
his advisors, planned the second front on the War on Terror: Iraq (Pfiffner, 2010).
The First Gulf War in 1991 resulted in the United States driving Saddam Hussein’s army
out of neighboring Kuwait but not ousting him from power. Neoconservatives (neocons) were a
loosely connected group of public figures and defense minds, some of who became members of
George W. Bush’s administration, who saw this move as a mistake (Pfiffner, 2010). According
to Pfiffner (2010) Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz were both
neoconservatives who strongly advocated for an Iraq invasion. Claims that Saddam Hussein
possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and was connected to the terrorist attacks of
9/11 helped garner public support for the invasion in early 2003 (Pfiffner, 2010). President Bush,
Vice President Cheney, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld all promised WMDs would be found in
Iraq (McGovern, 2006). The CIA’s David Kay led a team of experts in Iraq following the
invasion and found no evidence whatsoever of WMDs (Pfiffner, 2010). Moreover Saddam’s
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connection with al-Qaeda also was found to be untrue. The estimated costs of the Iraq war were
also underestimated as well (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008).
According to Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), when adjusted for inflation, the Iraq war was the
most expensive war in the nation’s history other than World War II. The money was not being
spent nearly as efficiently as during World War II, where the average cost per troop was
$100,000 compared to $400,000 with the Iraq war. The Bush administration spent $368 billion
on defense activities pertaining to Iraq from 2003-2007 (Sunshine, 2007). These additions do not
account for the expected $500 billion or more than what would normally be the defense budget
in peacetime. Spending $7.1 billion per month in Iraq (McGovern, 2006) was not expected back
in 2003 when Bush decided to invade it.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Office of Management and Budget director Mitch
Daniels estimated the Iraq war would cost in the $50-60 billion range (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008).
A Bush administrator, Andrew Natsios, claimed that rebuilding Iraq after the invasion would
cost only $1.7 billion (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). William Nordhaus (2002) wrote that
underestimating the costs of war is a common way to garner public support, with the American
Civil War costing the union 13 times the original cost estimate and Vietnam costing over 10
times original estimates. He went on to say that public support is obtained easier if the upcoming
war is “…thought to be short, cheap, and bloodless” (2002, p. 42). There was not much spirited
debate in Congress from the war’s opposition, and the Iraq War Resolution passed with
bipartisan support in both houses in October 2002 (Pfiffner, 2010). As the wars dragged on, they
became increasingly unpopular. What were at first thought to be quick and not so expensive
invasions turned into extended warfare and nation-building. The end result was record-level
defense spending (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).
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As previously shown in Figure 3, defense spending was at $304.73 billion in 2001 and by
2004 had already risen to $455.83 billion (OMB, 2011). By 2010, spending would be up to
$693.6 billion. In addition to the increased personnel and operations cost, there were other
reasons attributable to the soaring defense costs, such as urban warfare, troop surges,
recruitment, oil, and the need for contractors.

Warfare
The military operations were much more difficult than anticipated. Nordhaus (2002)
predicted the fighting in Iraq would be complicated due to urban warfare. Insurgents blended in
with the public in the urban settings, which made it difficult for coalition forces to avoid
civilians. Ricks (2009) acknowledged that the U.S. was heading toward defeat in Iraq by 2005.
Our forces were not making progress against the insurgency and the popularity of the war back
home had waned. Troop morale was at an all-time low. The strategy became a counterinsurgency
approach in Iraq when General David Petraeus took command in January 2007 (Ricks, 2009).
This involved attempting to win over the Iraqi people so they would embrace democracy and the
American mission. Andrew Krepinevich, a prominent defense expert at the time, said that the
military should shift its focus from battling insurgents to providing security and opportunity to
the Iraqi people (Ricks, 2009). A result in this was striking deals with local militias and in effect
putting them on U.S military payrolls. The Sunni Awakening in Iraq saw 103,000 “security
contracts” on payroll in Iraq at $30 million per month at its height in 2008 (Ricks, 2009). Even
with former enemies on the payroll, the military was still unable to prevent desertion of the men
back into insurgent forces (Dunn & Futter, 2010).
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Another costly aspect of the counterinsurgency was the use of contractors for services. As
mentioned previously, the Sunni Awakening had the effect of putting former insurgents on
American payroll as a means of counterinsurgency. Other contractors were actual businesses that
the military paid in exchange for services. The military most commonly contracted the
reconstruction duties, like rebuilding infrastructure (Cancian, 2008). Other areas that used
contractors were logistics, interpreters, security, and bodyguards. Bodyguard contractors, such as
Blackwater, were extremely controversial as they were involved in many violent incidents but
were not under military control. Mark Cancian (2008) used Blackwater as an example of the high
costs associated with contracting. The average Blackwater employee cost the government
$445,000 per year, compared to an average Army sergeant who made $50-70,000 per year and
capable of performing the same work. The counterinsurgency approach was aided by the troop
surge of 2007, which resulted in higher costs for the Iraq War.

Iraq and Afghanistan Troop Surges
President Bush implemented the troop surge of 2007, which sent 30,000 additional troops
into Iraq (Ricks, 2009). There were already approximately 180,000 troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan at this time (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). This came at a time when the Iraq insurgency
was gaining momentum against U.S. forces. The surge was approved and came with a hefty price
tag. Robert Sunshine (2007) reported in his testimony before the House Budget Committee that
the cost would be $22 billion if the surge lasted twelve months but instead, it lasted eighteen
months (Ricks, 2009) costing an approximately $33 billion.
President Obama approved a similar surge of 30,000 troops into Afghanistan in 2009 in
an attempt to shift momentum back to coalition forces (Friel, 2009). Friel (2009) put the price tag
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of the additional troops in the $30-40 billion dollar range. There were additional factors that
made Afghanistan’s surge more expensive than Iraq’s. The logistics in Afghanistan were
undesirable for the army due to the terrain, unfriendly neighboring countries, and it containing
five times fewer airports than Iraq (Freedberg, 2010). Freedberg goes on to note the average cost
per troop in Afghanistan was $1.125 million per year compared to $556,000 per troop in Iraq.

Other Factors
The two-front wars the United States were fighting and the two troop surges were reasons
why defense spending soared in the past decade. But there were other contributing factors, such
as an increase in recruitment, expensive oil, and use of contractors.
The consistent troop presence followed by the troop surges put a strain on military
personnel. The unpopularity of the war had also affected recruitment (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008).
Regular military pay was raised 28% and standards were lowered by the Pentagon in an attempt
to meet recruitment and retention goals. In effect, the federal government was spending more
money on less qualified soldiers than pre-war levels (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). It hired thousands
of additional recruiters, increased spending on national advertising, and increased sign-on
bonuses throughout this time (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). This resulted in the cost per military
recruit increasing from $14,500 in 2003 to $18,842 by 2008 (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). Figure 8
shows the continued increase in personnel costs from 2001-2010 (OMB, 2011).
Dramatic increases in oil prices drove up war costs. As shown in Figure 9, the first
purchase price (FPP) of crude oil per barrel for the United States in 2001 was $21.84 (U.S.
Energy Information Administration). By 2010, the FPP for the United States was $74.71. The
rising cost of oil was not anticipated prior to the wars. Bush economic advisor Larry Lindsay
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predicted that ousting Saddam Hussein in Iraq would lead to such an increase in production of oil
resulting in lower prices (Nordhaus, 2002). It turned out the opposite occurred as the price of oil
ballooned over the course of the decade. The amount of fuel used in Afghanistan in 2009, at the
height of the war, helps put into perspective the enormity of the fuel costs. Coalition forces
needed 1.1 million gallons of fuel delivered daily for operations, up from only 475,000 gallons
per day the year before (Freedberg, 2010).

Figure 7: Defense Personnel Costs: 2001-2010 ($ Billions)
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Companies that performed reconstruction efforts in Iraq saw high profits but were also
subject of corruption allegations. Former Senator and Presidential nominee George McGovern
(2006) used an example of Halliburton receiving an uncompetitive $2.4 billion contract that was
discontinued in 2006 due to $1 billion in questionable fees being discovered by audits.
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Halliburton received at least $19.3 billion in contracts from the military in the last decade, so it is
not surprising the stock price went up over 200% during that time (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008).
Figure 8: First Purchase Price of Oil Per Barrel: 2001-2010 (U.S. Dollars)
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(Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration)

Explanation
How did we end up with such high costs? The budget making process lends itself to
making defense spending appear not to be as high as it may really be. As Nordhaus (2011) said
earlier, upfront costs of war are often underestimated as a way for the public to support the
efforts.
Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008, p. 22) explained how both wars were funded with emergency
appropriations from Congress and called it a “mockery of the budget process.” By doing so,
budget staff from both parties and the appropriate committees did not have the opportunity to
thoroughly review the numbers. Once the Department of Defense (DOD) has appropriated the
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funds, there is no guarantee that the funds will be used most efficiently. In 2007, the DOD failed
its yearly financial audit for the tenth year in a row due to what Inspector General for the DOD,
Thomas Gimble, referred to as long-standing and pervasive financial management problems
(Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). The Congressional Research Service described the DOD’s budget
explanations for cost of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as “limited, incomplete, and
sometimes inconsistent” (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008, p. 23). Another effect of this manner of
funding the wars was that it muddied the costs, so that instead of a package with a large price tag
attached upfront, the funding has been piece by piece, spread across several years which makes
costs not seem so exorbitant (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). Wildavsky (2004) wrote that is difficult
to cut defense spending in many cases because appropriations overlap from year to year and
deciding to cut off funding is not a possibility.

Black Budget
An example of the lack of transparency with defense spending in regards to the budget is
what Irene Rubin referred to as the “black budget” (2007). Spending for intelligence gathering
and analysis, as well as some weapons acquisitions are part of the black budget kept secret
(Rubin, 2007). There are several potential budgetary problems that the black budget caused. Due
to its secret nature, the black budget was not up for public debate and did not have to compete
with other projects in terms of priority (Rubin, 2007). Rubin (2007) also noted that there was
minimal oversight provided by auditors of the General Accountability Office, possibly
contributing to the rising defense spending and national deficit.
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Budget-Strategy Disconnect
Major Matthew McCreary (2012) was a veteran who wrote about the problem of basing
strategy off the budget. Government officials have affected military strategy by pursuing their
own agendas. There was a major disconnect between the budget process and strategy
formulation. Budgets were annual and only looked toward the next year, while strategies can
look several years into the future (McCreary, 2012). He called it “putting the cart before the
horse (McCreary, 2012, p. 13).” There are more people in government who influence and
formulate the budget than those who formulate strategy, which he argued drastically decreased
the possibility of achieving strategic objectives. Program managers fought for continued funding
in the budget, even if it no longer served the general mission. When that happened, the mission
was sometimes lost in the ever-growing programs, which helped justify an increased military
presence around the world (McCreary, 2012).

Earmark Spending
McCreary (2012) also discussed the environment that allowed for major pork barrel
spending. It was easy for Congressmen to slip “riders” into large spending packages, which
helped to broker deals with other Congressmen. Irene Rubin (2007) cited the taxpayer watchdog
group Citizens Against Government Waste, which found nearly 10,000 government-wide
earmarks in FY 2006 at a cost of $29 billion. In 2007 alone, the DOD Inspector General
identified over 2,500 earmarks that came in at $5.87 billion (McCreary, 2012).

Military Inflation
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Another explanation of the major defense spending increases from 2001-2010 could be
military inflation. Benjamin Fordham (2003) conducted a study that found that the inflation rate
of military goods and services is higher than nonmilitary items. This occurred when spending
was heavy during wars and not brought down to pre-war levels once wars were over. Fordham
(2003) explained that there is often pressure to reward returning soldiers and to save defensedependent industries. The inflation of military goods and services coupled with fighting two wars
helps explain rising defense costs. The government had to increase the usage of the military due
to the wars, which has a higher inflation rate than non-military goods, which in a sense created a
double-edged sword. The implications to the budget and nation of the defense spending over the
past decade should also be discussed.

Implications of Deficits & Debt
Yearly budget deficits and higher levels of national debt have consequences. Rubin et al
(2004) argue that the federal budget is on an unsustainable path. Some basic effects of ongoing
budget deficits, they explain are: decreased national savings, reduced domestic investment, and
increased borrowing from abroad. Along with decreased domestic investment comes less future
income. That helps explain why revenue for the federal government has been down over the past
decade. Heo and Eger (2005, p. 793) conducted a study aiming to find the relationship between
defense spending and the economy in what they called the “security-prosperity dilemma.” They
found that defense spending has a negative indirect effect on economic growth by way of
investment and exporting (2005).
Auerbach and Gale (2011) wrote of their concern about the impact the future budget
deficits would have on the nation. As a result of the spending in the past decade, budget deficits
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between 5 and 6% of GDP should be expected. For the next decade, revenue growth is
anticipated to not grow as fast as spending, resulting in further expansion of the national debt.
The enormous budget deficits have resulted in sequestration to help curb spending. A
sequester was established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 as
an executive order cancelling certain budgetary resources to enforce spending limits (Saturno,
2011). However, these budget-controlling mechanisms expired along with the Act in 2002
(Rubin, 2007). Congress passed the Budget Control Act of 2011, which reestablished
discretionary spending caps and called for sequestration to achieve further deficit reduction from
2012-2021 (Saturno, 2011).
The Budget Control Act of 2011 called for $487 billion in cuts for defense spending over
the next 10 years (Sharp, 2012). Sharp (2012) noted that the DOD made improvements with its
business practices, reformed compensation benefits, and made weapons programs more
sustainable as opposed to cutting down the force structure of the military. However, he stated
that the Pentagon estimates the sequester will rise from $487 billion in cuts over a decade to over
$950 billion in cuts. This will lead to a “pivot but hedge” approach, where the military begins to
withdraw from Afghanistan but still maintain a presence in Asia and the Middle East (Sharp,
2012, p. 3). The enormity of cuts the DOD will be facing will require it to downsize the number
of troops, despite the need to maintain a strong presence in the world.

Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, there were a number of factors that contributed to the defense spending
increasing from $304.73 billion in 2001 to $693.59 billion in 2010. The wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq along with the respective troop surges were the main contributors. As a result, personnel
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costs went up in an effort to maintain the appropriate troop presence. The increased use of
contractors and spikes in the price of oil were also contributing factors. The federal government
will have some tough budgetary choices to make over the course of the next decade. Running
such large budget deficits is unsustainable.
There are several ways to avoid large defense spending increases in the future. Prewar
planning needs to improve. As presented earlier, greatly underestimating the costs of war
(Nordhaus, 2002) can make the decision to go to war more popular at the time but lead to
increased costs down the road. To go along with that suggestion, the black budget should be used
with more discretion, so that large defense expenditures are open to public debate and scrutiny.
Now that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are nearing an end, the military has begun decreasing
its worldwide presence. The military can also look at the relatively small amount other
industrialized nations spend on defense in an effort to not be responsible for so much of the
world’s military spending.
Adams and Leatherman (2011) lay out two options for the nation: increasing massive
debt to further global military operations or restrain military missions to focus on economic
recovery. Defense is a reasonable place to start cuts, accounting for 56% of discretionary
spending in 2010 (Adams & Leatherman, 2011). They claim that force size drives the defense
budget, so the military could start trimming costs by scaling back the number of troops.
Counterinsurgency and nation-building can hopefully be avoided in the future, which will
diminish the need for as many troops. There are also 70,000 troops in Europe and 60,000 in Asia
in non-combat zones. There could be drastic cuts to those numbers without threatening national
security (Adams & Leatherman, 2011). Thompson (2011) notes that the military has more than
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500 bases worldwide. According to him, there is real danger that the military is spreading itself
too thin around the world.
The amount the U.S. spends on defense is quite remarkable compared to other
industrialized nations. A study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found the
U.S. accounts for 45% of the entire world’s military spending (Foster et al, 2008). China spent
$114 billion on defense in 2010, not even 20% of the United States’ $693.6 billion. The
sequestration called for by the Budget Control Act of 2011 will help curb defense spending and
ultimately lead to reduced deficits. Future research can be done in the future to determine the
amount of cuts resulting from the Act as well as the effects it has on the budget and national
debt.
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